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Abstract
Using Polish Labour Force Survey data, we examine whether competition for labour has
induced individual pay to depend on outside options, availability and quality of jobs.
Exploiting the lack of inter-regional job and worker flows we estimate the elasticity of
individual pay, amongst a rich set of individual characteristics, to be approximately -0.1
for local unemployment (job shortages) and + 0.1 for local job reallocation
(restructuring). Variations in local labour market conditions explain approximately 50 per
cent of the differences in expected individual earnings across regions, while differences
in inherited human capital and occupation structures explain the rest.
Keywords:  Wage Determination, Unemployment, Job Reallocation and Polish Regions.
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Introduction
The introduction of competition for labour in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) theoretically should induce individual earnings, for any given ability, to
reflect outside earning options.  In this paper we match regional, firm and individual level
data to explore whether this has been a reality in Poland during transition.
While the full benefits of labour market liberalisation have been constrained by
the lack of inter-region worker and job flows this has the advantage of allowing us to
model outside earning options to depend solely on local (regional) labour market
conditions
1.  In addition, intra-region structural rigidities may also have constrained the
role of competition in local labour markets. An important feature of local labour markets
in Poland is that they inherited idiosyncratic structures coming out of planning
2. While
local labour markets have the same economic institutions and macroeconomic
environment, we can expect unemployment (job shortages) and job reallocation
(restructuring) to evolve differently across local labour markets during transition.  We
intend to exploit the cross section variation in local labour market conditions in our
analysis of outside earning options and individual pay.
                                                          
1 Inter-regional job and worker flows (adjustments) have been virtually absent during transition (see Faggio
and Konings, 1999, and Boeri and Scarpetta 1996). The absence of migration flows ensures our
econometric work will not have to concern itself with the standard Harris-Todaro critique, the need to
model migration as a key labour supply determinant of regional wage and unemployment levels.
2  Boeri and Scarpetta (1996) explain growing polarisation in employment performance across Polish
regions as an outcome of the inherited and rather idiosyncratic firm structures. Exposure to world markets
rendered the capital accumulated by many firms hopelessly out-of-date. Many eastern regions of Poland
tended to be historically CMEA market oriented and enjoyed a privileged position in terms of allocation of
resources over the forty years of central planning. These regions had a high concentration of Mining,
Defence and Natural Resource Extraction industries. A stylised eastern region is one with a large industrial
conglomerate surrounded by private agricultural holdings with capital not easily adaptable to the market
economy. Yet, many western regions of Poland had produced goods for export outside the CMEA before
1990 and had developed better infrastructure and inherited capital that was more adaptable in the global
economy. Repkine and Walsh (1999) estimate the empirical relevance of historical trade links to be very
significant in the modelling of industrial production.5
Using regional data, we first identify conditions in local labour markets that
explain differences in expected (average) earnings across the regions of Poland during
transition. We model conditions in local labour markets using local unemployment rates
calculated from Labour Force Survey (LFS) data and local job reallocation rates
calculated from Amadeus Company Accounts data. The former empirically captures the
tightness of the labour market or job shortages. The latter captures the speed at which
new and restructured firms are replacing non-restructured firms in local firm populations.
The composition change in labour demand increases the number of good jobs in local
labour markets. In section I we review the theoretical and empirical literature that have
used unemployment in wage equations, and motivate why one should also consider using
job reallocation.
In section II we evaluate the impact of (instrumented) local labour market
conditions on average monthly wage levels using regional data across 49 (voivodships)
regions of Poland over the period 1991-96, while controlling for other unobservable
deterministic factors using panel data techniques. We find that employees who work in
regions of high unemployment earn less, on average, other things constant, than those
surrounded by low unemployment.  The elasticity of average pay with respect to local
unemployment is approximately -0.1. In addition, we find that workers in more
restructured regions receive higher pay, on average, other things constant, than those
surrounded by non-restructured firms. The elasticity of average pay with respect to local
job reallocation is approximately + 0.1.  In terms of local labour market conditions job
shortages do not tell the whole story. The nature of the jobs in the firm populations also
matter for wage determination.6
In section III we evaluate the impact of (instrumented) local labour market
conditions, human capital, and occupation characteristics on individual earnings using a
panel of males from the Polish LFS data over the period 1994-1996.
3 Our empirical
approach has a number of innovations. First, we match local unemployment and job
reallocation rates to the individual data and instrument to avoid simultaneity bias in our
results. Second, we correct for sample selection bias by conditioning our earnings
equation on a participation model. Finally, we include a rich set of education categories
and occupation controls.
The unemployment and job reallocation elasticity of individual pay is estimated to
be approximately -0.1 and +0.1, respectively, while controlling for a rich set of human
capital and occupation characteristics, among other factors. Large regional variation in
unemployment and job reallocation rates induce large differences in expected individual
earnings, for any given ability, across the various regions of Poland. Local outside
earning options explain approximately 50 per cent of the differences in expected
individual earnings across regions, while differences in inherited human capital and
occupation structures explain the rest.
A secondary issue investigated, is to what extent past investments in human
capital and choice of occupation under planning are rewarded in terms of earning
potential during the transition period.  Normally in mature market economies we would
expect investment in human capital to target high wage occupations. This selection bias is
                                                          
3 The general consensus within firm level CEE studies to date, as reviewed by Svejnar (1999), is that there
is little evidence of a detectable “wage curve” effect across CEE countries.  Yet, Basu et al (1997) for
example, using firm level data, finds the wage elasticity with respect to the local or (district-level)
unemployment rate is statistically significant, a negative coefficient of –0.03 for Poland. In contrast to Basu
et al, using individual data from the Polish Labour Force Survey we model individual earnings to depend7
not a strong feature of this data as most human capital and occupation structures were an
outcome of the planning era. However we do test which educational and occupational
specific work experience yield high returns from the market economy.
Our findings support the consensus that technical (specialist) education under the
communist regime is not as well rewarded as academic (broad) education during
transition. One should not use years of schooling but rather categorical variables, since
the type of education under planning is important.  Jobs for life and full participation
under planning ensures that using the number of years of working age is a good proxy for
work experience. While experience earnings profiles are very flat, only young workers,
under the age of 25, get a positive return to experience. These results again point to the
lack of return from years of work experience under planning. We find there are
occupational specific returns. For example, Hotels and Restaurants, Education, and
Health pay the same low pay as Agriculture, while Retailing, Transport and Construction
pay up to 20 per cent more and Finance, Motor Cars and Public Administration get over
20 per cent more than Agriculture. Finally, we also report nice interaction effects between
human capital and occupation characteristics and local labour market conditions.
Individuals with youth, academic education or in high wage occupations have elastic
responses to outside labour market conditions rather than unitary responses. Individuals
that are older, technically trained or in low wage occupations are found to have inelastic
responses to outside labour market conditions.  This is strong evidence of intra-regional
structural rigidities, legacies of planning that mitigate the ability of certain individuals to
                                                                                                                                                              
on (instrumented) local labour market conditions (local unemployment and job reallocation rates), human
capital and workplace characteristics.8
take advantage of their recent right to take up outside options and benefit from
competition in their local labour market.
Section I: Literature Review
The relationship between the wage and local unemployment levels has been
debated for many generations.  From the beginning of the 1970s, the first generation of
papers, summarised in Table 1, argued that regions with high unemployment also
experience high wage levels. The theoretical foundations for such a relationship can be
found in Harris and Todaro (1970)
4. Hall (1970, 1972), using data for twelve U.S. cities
in 1966, found a positive relationship between expected pay and unemployment when
estimating wage equations across cities.  Reza (1978), Adams (1985) and Marston (1985)
also found that there was a positive relationship using individual level data.
However, by the end of the 1980s this accord began to crumble.  The problem in
the earlier literature was a failure to control for regional fixed effects. Regional dummies
were not included in the estimated wage equations.  Including these effects led to new
evidence in a second generation of papers, summarised in Table 2, which suggested that
regional pay and unemployment were in fact negatively correlated
5. Using British data
Blackaby and Manning (1987, 1990a,b,c) find evidence of a negative spatial relationship
between joblessness and workers’ remuneration. Freeman (1988) used American and
more disaggregated British data to find similar results. Card (1990) used Canadian data to
establish the negative relationship.
                                                          
4 Their argument is based on Adam Smith’s theory of “compensating differentials” and a long run zero
migration equilibrium.9
Using larger microeconomic datasets, summarised in Table 3, Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994) document a negative empirical relationship between local unemployment
and pay determination which they term a “Wage Curve”. What emerges from the authors’
pooled cross-sectional regressions on micro-data is a pattern linking individual pay to
regional unemployment, with a typical wage curve described by the following
specification;
it t j it jt it D D X U W ε β β β β + + + + − = 3 2 2 0 ln 1 . 0 ln         (1.1)
The natural logarithm of individual i in period t hourly/monthly/yearly earnings, Wit, is
explained by the natural logarithm of regional unemployment rate, Ujt,,  a  vector of
workplace & human capital characteristics, Xit,(age, education, work experience and
occupation), regional and time dummies, Dj, and Dt,, respectively. Regression results on
samples across 12 countries suggest that the unemployment elasticity of pay
approximates, –0.1.  A hypothetical doubling of unemployment is associated with a drop
in pay of 10%.  Empirical estimates show that a worker who is employed in an area of
high unemployment earns less than an individual who works in a region with low
joblessness when controlling for other individual and regional specific factors. This
highlights the importance of the tightness of the outside labour market on the ability of
individuals to earn.
In general equilibrium models of unemployment, where the conventional labour
supply curve is replaced with a wage setting curve, a negative relationship between pay
and unemployment is clearly predicted. The macroeconomic models of Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (1991) and the microeconomic efficiency wage model of Shapiro and
                                                                                                                                                              
5 This correlation refers to levels of unemployment and wages and not changes in these variables found in a10
Stiglitz (1984) are good examples of modelling wage and unemployment outcomes with
conventional labour demand equations and imperfectly competitive wage setting
behaviour. The expected wage set in general equilibrium reflects an aggregation over
firms that reward productivity and pay labour rents.
The relationship between the wage and local job reallocation across firm
populations has not yet been studied. Yet, Belzil (2000), at the country level for
Denmark, finds a strong empirical link between real wages and job reallocation, amongst
other factors including unemployment. Planned economies were oversized in terms of
Industrial and Agricultural employment. Mass inter-sector job flows were anticipated. In
addition, the downsizing and restructuring of traditional firms and the entry of new firms
was expected to induce even greater intra-sector job reallocation over-time. In transition
economies, structural change in employment was clearly needed for economic efficiency.
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) write down a strong theoretical link relationship between
wage determination, unemployment and job reallocation from the previously Sate Owned
Sector (SOS) to the New Private Sector (NPS)
6.  Their model predicts that the expected
wage level in a labour market, among other factors, will be negatively related to the
unemployment rate and positively related to job reallocation. Unemployment reduces
expected earnings in the economy by blocking restructuring in the previously SOS and
inducing wage constraint in the NPS. Workers do not vote for restructuring due to a low
probability of re-employment after a possible layoff during restructuring.  Yet, strong
                                                                                                                                                              
conventional regional Phillips curves.
6 This approach incorporates an imperfectly competitive model of restructuring and insider wage
determination in the labour market to model expected earnings in the previously state owned, the new
private sector and in unemployment. This builds on Konings and Walsh (1994, 2000) and Bughin (1996)
who explicitly model interactions of imperfections in product and labour markets in partial equilibrium.11
NPS growth will induce restructuring of the previous SOS and reallocate jobs away from
the previous SOS towards the NPS. Given that wages, unemployment and job
reallocation are clearly jointly determined outcomes we will have to choose a good
instrument in the empirical sections of the paper to clearly identify the relationship.
We use the Amadeus Company Accounts Data is used to construct regional job
reallocation rates
7. We use the regional job reallocation rates constructed by Faggio and
Konings (1999).  They use the indices developed in Davis and Haltwinger (1992). We
define a discrete measure of firm i growth over the period t-1 to t in region j as follows:
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To examine the contribution of expanding and declining firms to the overall
evolution of regional employment we sum the growth rates of each growing firm (POS),
weighted by firm employment size, Sijt, and sum the absolute growth rates of each
declining firm (NEG) weighted by firm size Sijt ,
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The annual net change, NETjt, in regional employment is a net outcome that is
induced by employment growth in expanding firms being offset by employment falls in
declining firms. The reallocation of jobs across firms within regional employment is
captured by the RESjt index calculated as follows:
                                                          
7 The data consist of incorporated companies across all sectors that satisfy one of the following conditions:
Employment > 100, Total Assets > 16 million US dollars and operating revenues > 8 million US dollars.12
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Faggio and Konings (1999) analyse and model regional job reallocation rates
across five CEE countries including Poland. They find that the vast majority of job
reallocation occurs within region and not between regions. This indicates the lack of job
mobility across regions of Poland. In addition, striking differences in job flows are
observed within regions. For example in Warsaw the annual job creation rate was 4.7 per
cent, the annual job destruction rate was 5.4 per cent, leading to an annual job
reallocation rate of 9.7 per cent. Annually, nearly 10 per cent of employment is
reallocated away from one set of firms towards another during each year of transition. In
contrast in Zamoj, one of the weakest regions, the annual job creation rate was 2 per cent,
the annual job destruction rate was 4 per cent, leading to an annual job reallocation rate of
4 per cent. The factors behind intra-regional simultaneous job creation and destruction at
each point of the transition process were also examined. Most of the job flows were intra-
sector and not inter-sector. Firm level dynamics were driven mainly by, downsizing of
large firms, changing ownership structures and the market orientation of production.
 Job reallocation rates are pure compositional shifts in the firms that host jobs in
the regional employment pool over a period of a year.  Restructuring requires that
traditional firms either exit or move towards their production possibility frontier and
induce new firms to enter. Over-time, more jobs should find themselves in either new or
restructured firms. The job reallocation index captures this move to efficiency in firm
populations extremely well.  Job reallocation rates in narrowly defined sectors in mature
                                                                                                                                                              
The data set does exclude small firms. This is likely to underestimate the job reallocation rate but can be13
economies are even larger than those reported for transition economies
8. This index is
also likely to reflect compositional changes in firm populations that induce efficiency and
increase average pay. The nature of the composition shift will be different, but the effect
on wages should the same.  In the next section we present our empirical model of average
regional wages.
Section II: Empirical Model of the Outside Option
Table 4 presents average monthly wage, unemployment rates and job reallocation
rates, averaged over the period 1994 to 1996 across six groupings of Polish regions based
on public infrastructure deficits, outlined in Annex I. Nominal wages are expressed in
Polish Zloty. We observe that wages and restructuring increase as we move from Group I
to VI (the most developed region in each year).  Increases in wages and job reallocation
also increase within each regional grouping overtime, but more so in the more advanced
groupings, thus increasing the disparity in wage and restructuring levels across regions
overtime. The evolution of the unemployment rate across time and regions ranked by
their development level seems to follow an inverse U-shape during transition.
Unemployment increases as we move from Group I to Group III and then falls in the
most developed regions in each time period. Walsh (2000) provides evidence, using the
same regional taxonomy, that regional unemployment inflows increase and duration
shortens with regional job reallocation (instrumented by our regional public infrastructure
ranking), alongside other deterministic factors, inducing an inverse U-shape during
transition. This highlights the potential simultaneity in the determination of wages,
                                                                                                                                                              
expected to track trends in local job reallocation rates extremely well.14
unemployment and restructuring, joint outcomes driven by initial conditions of public
infrastructure deficits across regions.
 In what follows we provide econometric evidence for the assertion that wage
levels are determined by unemployment and restructuring levels across regions and time
while controlling for simultaneity problems and the presence of other deterministic but
omitted factors. We have information on 49 voivodships over a 6 year period giving us a
total of 294 observations. We estimate the impact of the log of the unemployment rate,
URjt, and job reallocation rate, RESjt, in region j and period t, on the log of the average
monthly wage, Wjt, in region j  and period t while controlling for other factors. Job
reallocation and unemployment rates are jointly determined by RANK, RANK squared
and RANK cubed, regional and year controls to avoid an endogeneity problem. RANK
takes on a value of 1 to 49, the public infrastructure ranking of the regions in Annex I.
The local job reallocation rate controls for the rate at which non-restructured firms are
been replaced with restructured firms during transition, this increasing the number of
good jobs in the local labour market. The local unemployment rate controls for job
shortages in the local labour market. The outside earnings (average monthly regional
wages) model is written as follows,
jt j t jt jt jt v D RE UR W ε β β β α + + + + + = 3 2 1 ln ln ln                                      (2.1)
Unobserved heterogeneity in region j is controlled for by the inclusion of a unit
specific residual, vj, that is comprised of a collection of factors not in the regression that
are specific to region and constant over time, for example, human capital and occupation
structures of regions, amongst other region specific factors.
                                                                                                                                                              
8 Baldwin et al. (1998) for the US and Walsh and Whelan (2000) for Ireland, using rich plant level data,15
The random effect specification is justified on the basis of a Hausman test. The
intercept and time dummies, in addition to the random effects, are also included in the
regression to control for the evolution of the unobservable macroeconomic deterministic
factors over time, such as inflation. The results of our expected outside earning
regressions across Polish regions are presented in Table 5 and Table 6.
In Table 5 we report results that do not control for the possibility of regional
specific omitted variables. In the final column we instrument the unemployment and job
reallocation rates. The unemployment elasticity is estimated to be in the region of -0.7
and the job reallocation elasticity is estimated to be in the region of 0.8. Tests for AR1 in
the residuals indicate that model specifications are not valid. It is likely that the same
regional specific omitted variables in each year are driving the auto-regressive processes.
In Table 6 we report the results of our random effect models,  which control for the
presence of region specific unobserved deterministic heterogeneity. Results from the
Hausman specification test verify the appropriateness of our random effect models. In the
final column of Table 6 we instrument the unemployment and the job reallocation rate.
The unemployment elasticity of pay for Poland is in the region of  –0.08 and the job
reallocation elasticity is estimated to be in the region of +0.8. Workers earn higher levels
of pay, on average, in regions that have lower unemployment and where firm populations
have undertaken more restructuring during transition. Given that the job reallocation and
unemployment rate are key determinants of expected regional monthly wages (outside
                                                                                                                                                              
calculate annual job reallocation rates of persistently around 15 per cent, 1973 to 1994.16
earning options) we now turn to examine their impact on individual earnings when
controlling for human capital and occupations characteristics, among other factors
9.
Section III: The Outside Option and Individual Earnings
The data used in this section is the Polish LFS data for the years 1994 to 1996.
The Polish LFS is a quarterly household survey, February, May, August and November,
starting in May 1992. This paper uses three data waves of the survey, corresponding to
the November 1994, 1995 and 1996.  The survey includes individuals older than 15 years
and there is no upper age limit.  However it does omit individuals living in military
barracks and dormitories, and any household members residing abroad. The Polish LFS
does not differ from the usual western survey. It contains more than 50 questions and
allows one to distinguish between the employed, the unemployed and those not in the
labour force according to ILO/OECD definitions.  From May 1993, the introduction of
the rotating panel resulted in one half of the current sample being used in the survey for
the next quarter, and the other half being used in the same quarter the following year.
This allows us to create a panel to track individuals overtime.  We have deliberately
excluded females in this panel as they are more affected by short-term supply side
considerations than their male counterparts. The total number of observations in the
survey is 75,204 and the panel is 14,203 male individuals over 1994, 1995, and 1996.
For each observation we have a record of age (year of birth), type of completed
education, regional location (voivodship), occupation (previous occupation) in the
reference week and wage which corresponds to their net earnings in the previous month
                                                          
9 We do check whether the unemployment rate is really a proxy for demographic variables such as
population density. Such variables are not significant in our regional or individual earnings regressions.17
from a main job measured in thousands of polish zloty
10. In annex II we outline the
categories of education and 2-digit occupation dummies used. We have imposed on this
panel the time varying local job reallocation rate (RES) and the local unemployment rate
(UR) used in the last section of the paper.
In Tables 8 and 9 we present results at the individual level using Polish LFS data
for the years 1994-1996. In Table 8 we estimate an augmented wage curve, assuming a
random selection process to employment, described by the following specification,
it t j it jt jt it D D X RES UR W ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln                 (3.1)
The natural logarithm of individual i previous months net earnings from a
principal job
11,  Wit, in period t is explained by the natural logarithm of the regional
unemployment rate, URjt,  and the regional job reallocation rate, RESjt. Both are
instrumented using RANK, identified as regions 1-49 in annex I, RANK squared, RANK
cubed, region and time dummies. This will allow us to test whether unemployment and
restructuring levels in local labour markets have similar effects on the expected earnings
of individuals, as on average regional wage levels estimated in the previous section, while
controlling for a rich set of human capital and occupation characteristics. These include
non-linearity’s in individual age/education and occupation dummies, Xit, regional and
time, Dj, and Dt, respectively.
In the model we have chosen not to include a measure of work experience gained
by each individual, years of tenure in a current job, or in their last job if out of
                                                          
10 In Poland, wages are not automatically linked to the consumer price index so our analysis is based on
nominal as opposed to real wage levels.  A potential criticism of our work is that to measure real wages in
different regions one should have regional consumer price data.  However, Blanchflower and Oswald
(1995) postulate that “nominal wages are likely to be sufficient whenever year and regional dummies can
be included in the regression equations”.  We have amended our model to include such dummies.18
employment. Under planning, most individuals stayed in the same job for the duration of
their working age and the participation rate was high. Working age and job tenure were
perfectly correlated. The transition period has started to break down this traditional
correlation. Yet, as documented in Table 7, one can calculate the percentage of males in
regional employment who have not changed jobs since the beginning of transition. The
most developed region has around 35 per cent of males and the least developed region
around 60 per cent of males remaining in the same pre-transitional job in 1996. Those
that resist job changes, apart from being in less advanced regions, are in older age groups.
Much of the work experience gained under communism by older workers may not be
rewarded so well in a market economy. Younger age groups have less work experience
but any work experience accumulated, particularly during transition, may be highly
rewarded in the market economy. We test for such a non-linearity in return to age, or a
flat experience and earning profile as documented for many other CEE countries
12.
 Using the same rationale it may also be the case that returns to education gained
under a communist regime may not be as good as those found using data from a western
economy.  Flanagan (1994) using pre and post-transition data for the Czech Republic,
includes education in the form of categorical variables, and finds a decrease in the rate of
return to vocational education from 0.11 to 0.07 and an increase in the rate of return to
university education from 0.31 to 0.39.  Chase (1997) using similar data for the Czech
Republic finds that the returns to technical education/training greatly diminished while
                                                                                                                                                              
11 Admittedly, it does not include fringe benefits or any payments of wages in kind.
12 Flanagan (1994) finds that the return to work experience gained under planning declined during the first
few years of transition in the Czech Republic.  Chase (1997) using micro-data for the Czech Republic and
Slovakia also finds that returns to work experience fell during transition as young workers were favoured in
jobs created during transition. Kreuger and Pische (1995) and Bird et al. (1994) for east Germany and19
returns to academic education experienced a large increase during transition. We intend
to test for such hypothesises using our categorical variables of education.
However when regressing monthly earnings of individuals on a vector of human
capital characteristics, the analytical problem of selectivity bias must be acknowledged.
The estimated rate of return to human capital characteristics might in fact be
underestimated because workers who expect the lowest pay choose not to participate.
The large drop in participation rates documented by Boeri (1999) for many former
socialist economies may suggest that there could be some sort of sample selection at
work. Bias in the estimates of a restricted sample is a well-known problem. An important
assumption that is made in the earnings regression is violated, and so the expected value
of the disturbance term will not be zero in the presence of an omitted variable. To
overcome this selectivity or omitted variable bias we run a Heckman (1979) two-step
estimation procedure.  Correcting for sample selection bias can theoretically change the
sign, magnitude or significance of the relationships found in regression  (3.1), assuming a
random selection into the workforce.  Our selection model is written as the following,
it t j it jt jt it D D X RES U Z ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln                       (3.2)
where Zit  = 1 if an individual is working, and zero otherwise. We include a
dummy for marriage an additional individual specific variable to identify the
instrumentation. The Heckman lambda, λ i, is computed for each individual in the selected
sample. In Table 9 we estimate an augmented wage curve, conditioned on the probability
of participating in employment, described by the following specification.
                                                                                                                                                              
Halpern and Korosi (1997) for Hungary document very flat experience earning profiles. Return to
experience gained under planning clearly fell during transition.20
it i t j it jt jt Z it D D X RES U W
it ε λ β β β β β β β + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln   (3.3)
The regression models the contributions of our explanatory variables to the
expected earnings of all males of working-age as it is conditioned on the probability of
participating in employment.
The unconditioned results in the second column of Table 8 and the conditioned
results in the second column Table 9 are very similar. No evidence of sample selectivity
bias was found. We find that the impact of the outside labour market has the same
estimated impact on pay even when we control for a rich set of individual and occupation
characteristics and sample selection bias. The estimated unemployment elasticity of pay
is -0.11 and restructuring elasticity of pay is estimated to be 0.07.  Regional
unemployment rates can be as high as 25 per cent and as low as 3 per cent, while regional
job reallocation rates can be higher than 10 per cent and lower than 1 per cent. Both of
these rates dictate the availability and quality of the jobs in terms of pay in the outside
local labour market. For any given occupation and human capital characteristics,
individuals can expect to have large differences in expected earnings across the various
regions of Poland.  For example, Warsaw paid 30 per cent more, on average, than the
average pay across all other regions during the period 1994-1996.  Outside local labour
market conditions are estimated to explain 51 per cent of this differential, and individual
characteristics the remaining 49 per cent, where local job reallocation accounts for 34 per
cent and local unemployment rate 17 per cent, respectively.
  In addition, given the nature of local labour markets, we find that individuals get
higher pay due to certain human capital and workplace characteristics, among other
factors. We report the estimated rate of return to human capital and workplace21
characteristics in Table 10.  We find that earnings, holding other factors constant,
increase by 22 per cent for those with at least academic primary education, 25 per cent
with academic secondary schooling and 57 per cent with university education. The
returns to vocational primary at 17 per cent, technical secondary at 18 per cent and
technical college at 38 per cent, are clearly less than the corresponding academic training.
This supports a general consensus that during transition, technical education under the
communist regime is not as well rewarded as academic education during transition.
We measure work experience as years of working age. While experience earnings
profiles are very flat, only young workers, under the age of 25, get a positive return to
experience, 1 per cent for every year. The return to work experience declines slowly in
every year up to 55 years of age and declines at a rate of 5 per cent thereafter.  These
results again point to the lack of return from years of work experience under planning.
Finally, we test the rate of return from inheriting certain occupational skills. We find
there are occupational specific returns. In table 10 we group these into occupations that
get the same, up to, and above 20 per cent of Agricultural pay.
Given that certain human capital and occupation characteristics yield a higher
expected return than others, it may be the case that the response of individual pay to
outside labour market conditions may not be uniform. Intra-regional structural rigidities
may mitigate the ability of certain individuals to take advantage of outside options. In
table 11 we report the elasticity of expected individual pay with respect to local labour
market conditions when estimating the model (3.3) on different groupings of the data by
age, sector and education. Males when grouped by youth, academic education, or a
service sector job have elastic responses to outside labour market conditions rather than22
unitary responses. Groupings by older, technically trained or agriculture/manufacturing
sectors are found to have inelastic responses to outside labour market conditions.  This is
strong evidence of intra-regional structural rigidities resulting from planning. Apart from
the market system not rewarding certain human capital and occupation types, they are
also less able to exploit outside earning opportunities created by the market economy.
Conclusion
The benefits of competition in the Polish labour market have been inhibited by the
lack of inter-region worker and job flows and intra-region structural rigidities. Yet, these
legacies of planning have allowed us to study the role of competition in the labour market
in an environment far less complex than that observed in mature market economies.  This
paper provides us with a clear picture of the importance of competition and outside
options in labour markets undergoing a transition to a market economy. Overall the
liberalisation of the market has allowed individuals, by varying degrees, to earn more by
exploiting the presence of outside earning options in local labour markets.23
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Table 1
First Generation Papers 1970s and 1980s
____________________________________________________________________
Table 2
Second Generation Papers late 1980s and 1990s
G.H.S. General Household Survey & C.P.S. Current Population Survey
___________________________________________________________________________
Author Data Result (Pay & 
Unemployment relationship
Hall (1970, 1972) BLS* 12 U.S. cities in 1966 Positive
Sample size = 12 regions
Reza (1978) BLS* 1970-1972 U.S. data Positive
sample size = 18 regions
Adams (1985) U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1970- Positive
Sample size = 2000
Marston (1985) Current Pop. Survey (1970s) Positive
Sample size = 0.5 million
* Bureau of Labour Statistics
Author Data Country Result
Blackaby & Manning (1987, General Household Survey 1964-1984 U.K. Negative
1990a, 1990b, 1990c) Microeconometric wage equations
Sample: 7,288 employed males
Card (1990) Sample of 1293 Canadian labour contracts Canada Negative
1968-1983
Uses OLS & instrumental variable methods
Freeman (1988) G.H.S & C.P.S* U.K. & U.S.A. Negative
Janssens & Konings (1999) Social Economic Panel 1985, 1988 & 1992 Belgium Negative
Sample:  6,727 households
Blanchflower & Oswald (1994) See table 3 12 countries Negative28
Table 3
Blanchflower & Oswalds’ Wage Curves in 12 Nations
**ISSP= International Social Survey Programme
Column 4: Coefficients on local unemployment variables in micro-econometric wage equations.
Column 5: Fixed effects refer to controls for region or occupations.  In all equations, personal variables are
included as controls.
Country Dependent Data-set Coefficient  Fixed  Sample 
Variable on LogU Effects size
USA Annual Earnings Current Population Survey -0.1 Yes 1,730,175
1963-1990
UK Monthly Earnings General Household Survey -0.8 Yes 175,500
1973-90
Canada Gross annual earnings Survey of Consumer Finances  -0.9 Yes 82,739
1972-87
S. Korea Gross Monthly Earnings Occupational Wage Surveys -0.4 Yes 1,359,387
1971-86
Austria Gross monthly earnings ISSP** 1986-89 -0.9 Some 1,587
Italy Gross monthly earnings ISSP 1986-89 -0.1 Yes 1,041
Holland Net monthly earnings ISSP 1988-91 -0.12 Some 1,867
Switzerland Net monthly earnings ISSP 1987 -0.12 No 645
Norway Gross yearly earnings ISSP 1989-91 -0.8 Some 2,599
S. Ireland Net monthly earnings ISSP 1988-91 -0.36 No 1,363
Australia Weekly income IDS 1986 -0.19 No 8,429
Germany Gross monthly earnings ISSP 1986-91 -0.13 Yes 4,62929
Table 4
Job Reallocation Rates and Unemployment Rates and Wage Levels by Regional Social
Development Groupings
Regional
Grouping
Job Reallocation Rate Unemployment Rate Monthly Wage
1994  I 1.03 16.8 446.2
 II 2.12 16.9 461.3
 III 2.56 18.8 474.7
 IV 3.48 22.6 500.0
 V 4.37 18.9 512.8
 VI 6.94 12.1 530.1
Min 425.1 Max 657.3
1995  I 2.19 16.2 588.2
 II 4.44 16.6 610.4
 III 4.45 17.7 626.3
 IV 4.63 21.0 630.0
 V 5.71 17.8 667.8
 VI 7.98 11.1 700.9
Min 566.3 Max 876.7
1996  I 2.57 14.1 740.0
 II 4.51 14.9 769.7
 III 4.81 15.9 784.8
 IV 5.45 18.4 790.4
 V 5.87 16.2 844.0
 VI 8.44 09.4 897.9
Min 713.4 Max 1130.6
Source: Amadeus Company Accounts Data and Polish Year Books. Group I is the least
developed and Group VI the most developed grouping.30
Table 5
OLS Regressions across Polish Regions 1991-96
OLS OLS 2SLS**
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
R
2 0.99 0.98 0.98
Constant  3.4
   (18.0)*
3.3
(15.6)*
3.2
(15.2)*
Log Unemployment Rate   -.12
    (7.6)*
-.11
  (6.6)*
-.07
(5.0)*
Log Job Reallocation Rate .02
   (2.8)*
.08
   (11.0)*
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 294 294 294
Heterosced. χ 2(55) = 14.7 χ 2(56) =11.8 χ 2(56) =13.3
 AR1 χ 2(1) = 188.7 χ 2(1) = 188.6 χ 2(1) = 169.1
T-statistics in parenthesis,  * indicates significance at the 5% level.
** Instruments include RANK, RANK squared, time and regional dummies.
Table 6
GLS Regressions across Polish Regions 1991-96
GLS GLS GLS**
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
R
2 (Within ) 0.99 0.99 0.99
R
2 (Between) 0.19 0.19 0.48
R
2 (Overall) 0.99 0.98 0.99
Constant  3.3
   (12.1)*
3.2
  (9.7)*
3.2
(8.9)*
Log Unemployment Rate  -.06
    (2.6)*
-.06
  (2.2)*
-.08
  (2.2)*
Log Job Reallocation Rate .02
  (1.6)
.08
   (4.9)*
Random Effects YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 294 294 294
Hausman test χ 2(6) =  4.8 χ 2(6) = 3.5 χ 2(6) = 0.01
Heterosced. χ 2(55) = 5.4 χ 2(56) = 2.9 χ 2(56) =2.94
 AR1 χ 2(1) = 1.7 χ 2(1) = 1.7 χ 2(1) = 1.7
T-statistics in parenthesis,  * indicates significance at the 5% level.
** Instruments include RANK, RANK squared, time and regional dummies.31
Table 7
Age Composition of Job Tenure by Regional Group 1996
Job Tenure 15-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years >44 years
I 48 < 7 years 25 35 28 12
52 > 7 years 02 7 3 8 3 5
II 49 < 7 years 23 37 25 15
51 > 7 years 02 5 3 6 3 9
III 51 < 7 years 23 38 26 13
49 > 7 years 02 1 4 4 3 5
IV 55 < 7 years 28 33 24 15
45 > 7 years 02 1 4 1 3 8
V 48 < 7 years 25 32 28 15
52 > 7 years 02 4 4 4 3 2
VI 58 < 7 years 23 32 27 18
42 > 7 years 01 6 3 5 4 9
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey32
Table 8
Wage Curve Regressions across Polish Individuals.
2SLS 2SLS
Log Wage Log Wage
R
2 0.87 0.89
Constant 6.5
(6.2)*
8.1
(8.4)*
Log Unemployment Rate** -.15
(9.3)*
-.11
(7.6)*
Log Job Reallocation Rate** .07
(4.3)*
.07
(4.6)*
Age .13
(18.4)*
.08
(12.4)*
Age
2 -.003
(15.6)*
-.002
(9.7)*
Age
3 .00002
(13.8)*
.00001
(7.8)*
Education .49
(23.3)*
Education
2 -.10
(15.9)*
Education
3 .01
(13.6)*
Regional Dummies YES YES
Occupation Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
Observations 26,404 26,404
T-statistics in parenthesis, Assuming Random Selection 1994-1996
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
** Instruments include RANK, RANK squared, RANK cubed, time and regional
dummies33
Table 9
Earning Regression Conditioned on Probability of Participating 1994-1996
Log Wage Heckman Selection Model Heckman Selection Model
Constant 6.5
(6.2)*
7.9
(6.4)*
Log Unemployment Rate** -.16
(5.4)*
-.11
(4.1)*
Log Job Reallocation Rate** .06
(3.4)*
.07
(3.6)*
Age .13
(19.6)*
.08
(12.4)*
Age
2 -.003
(16.9)*
-.002
(9.6)*
Age
3 .00002
(15.3)*
.00001
(7.8)*
Education .50
(23.4)*
Education
2 -.10
(16.1)*
Education
3 .01
(13.7)*
Probit
Constant 2.5
(7.2)*
2.3
(6.3)*
Log Unemployment Rate** .11
(1.9)
.09
(1.5)
Log Job Reallocation Rate** .04
(0.8)*
.05
(.09)
Age -.13
(6.1)*
-11
(4.9)*
Age
2 .003
(7.2)*
.003
(6.1)*
Age
3 -.00003
(9.2)*
-.00003
(8.1)*
Married -.03
(1.6)
-.03
(1.6)
Education .42
(4.9)*
Education
2 -.14
(5.4)*
Education
3 .01
(4.9)*
Regional Dummies YES YES
Occupation Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
Rho -.28 -.02
Heckman Lamba -.10
(13.1)*
-.009
(.013)
Observations 42,621 42,621
Z-statistics in parenthesis
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
** Instruments include RANK, RANK squared, RANK cubed, time and regional
dummies34
Table 10
Rate of Return to Human Capital and Occupation Characteristics
(Relative to the default in bold).
Not Completed Primary
Primary Education (Hauptschule) .22
Technical Training (Meister, Geselle) .17
Technical High School (Technisches
Gymnasium)
.18
High School (Gymnasium) .25
Technical College .38
University .57
Age  15
Age  20 .01
Age  25 .00
Age  35 -.02
Age  45 -.04
Age  55 -.05
Age  65 -.05
Agriculture*
2, 9,12, 24,29,30, 31, 32, 33    Value < 0
4,7,8,10,14,15,16,17,18,20,22,23,25,27 0 >  Value <  0.2
5,6,11,13,19,21,28,26,         Value >  0.2
*ANNEX II OCCUPATION CATEGORIES35
Table 11
Elasticity of Pay with respect to Local Unemployment and Local Job Reallocation
by Human Capital and Occupation Groupings.
Local Unemployment Local Job Reallocation
Age
< 34 -0.15 +0.10
> 34 -0.09 +0.08
Sector
Agriculture Not Significant Not Significant
Manufacturing -0.05 +0.06
Services -0.13 +0.12
Education
Academic -0.14 +0.08
Technical -0.01 +0.06
*Regressions as in Table 9, splitting data by Human Capital and Occupation Groupings.36
ANNEX I. RANKING OF REGIONS BY INHERITED PUBLIC
INFRASTRUCUTRE
Some previous studies have developed regional labour market taxonomies of
Poland, for example, Huber and Scarpetta (1994) and Góra and Lehmann (1995).  In this
section we outline the taxonomy of Polish regions based on the level of public
infrastructure development that persisted across regions up to 1996. Our taxonomy ranks
all 49 voivodships (the highest regional administrative units) in a continuum of public
infrastructure development. We also bundle voivodships into six groups which represent
development from Group I (least developed) to Group VI (the most developed).
Our classification scheme ranks voivodships by six infrastructure indicators.
Using a Borda electoral scheme, the sum of the best six rankings establishes the overall
score for each region.  Thus, the highest possible score is 6, when a region is always
ranked number one, and the worst possible score is 294, when a region is always ranked
last, at 49. The regions are then sorted in ascending order. Large discrete breaks in the
score of voivodships determined the hiatus between our six regional groupings, leading to
the regional taxonomy of Table A1.
< Table A1 here >
The taxonomy reflects a systematic ranking of regions by their infrastructure
development that persists during the transition period.  With the exception of Warsaw and
Lodz, all regions in our regional groupings I, II and III are located in eastern regions of
Poland. Eastern regions mainly inherited poor infrastructure, while western regions
inherited superior infrastructure.    37
TABLE A1
Taxonomy of the Inherited Public Infrastructure of Polish regions 
a
 I I I  III  IV  V  VI
41. Ciechanowskie 32.  Chelmskie 25.  Czestochowskie 17.  Walbrzyskie 8.   Katowickie 1.  Warszawskie
42. Ostroleckie 33.  Kieleckie 26  .Bialostockie 18.  Slupskie 9.   Zielonogorskie 2.  Szczecinskie
43. Krosnienskie 34.  Radomskie 27.  Plockie 19.  Elblaskie 10  Legnickie 3.  Poznanskie
44. Sieradzkie 35. Tarnowskie 28.  Suwalskie 20   Gorzowskie 11. Bydgoskie 4.  Wroclawskie
45. Przemyskie 36.  Koninskie 29   Kaliskie 21.  Lubelskie 12. Opolskie 5.  Krakowskie
46. Bialskopodlaskie 37  Skierniewickie 30  Rzeszowskie 22   Torunskie 13. Koszalimskie 6.  Lodzkie
47. Siedleckie 38  Nowosadeckie 31  Piotrkowskie 23.  Leszczynskie 14. Bielskie 7. Gdanskie
48. Lomzynskie 39. Tarnobrzeskie 24   Pilskie 15. Jeleniogorskie
49. Zamojskie 40. Wloclawskie 16. Olsztynskie
a Ranked in ascending order by a rank score that sums  the  ranked positions in  six  indicators summarised by the above taxonomy in TableA2.43
A: Number of Telephones in a region per 1000 inhabitants : A developed telephone
network is an important part of the social capital infrastructure within a region.
Measuring the number of telephones in a region per 1000 inhabitants is a simple
indicator of the quality of public infrastructure in the region. The most (least)
developed region has 391.5 (136.2) phones per 1000 inhabitants.
B:  Number of Fax Machines in a region per 1000 inhabitants:  Related to the
provision of a telephone network is the availability of fax machines within a region.
The most (least) developed region has 60 (16.9) fax machines per 1000 inhabitants.
C: Number of Railways in a region per 100km squared: Another simple indicator of
the quality of public infrastructure in a region is the number of railways in that region
per 100 km squared. The most (least) developed region has 21.8 (2.7) railways per
100 km squared.
D:  Number of Public Roads per 100km squared: The quality of public infrastructure
is also enhanced by the number of public roads per 100 km squared in a region. The
most (least) developed region has 180.1 (43.4) per 100km squared.
Share of Population in Urban Areas: A relatively high share is indicative of
decentralised economic activity. The most (least) developed region has 93 (31) per
cent of populations in urban areas
F:  Share of Services in Total Regional Employment (per cent): A developed service
sector is an important part of public infrastructure. The most (least) developed region
has 63 (26) per cent of employment classified as services.44
ANNEX II EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION CATEGORIES
1  Not Completed Primary
2  Primary Education (Hauptschule)
3  Technical Training (Meister, Geselle)
4  Technical High School (Technisches Gymnasium)
5  High School (Gymnasium)
6  Technical College
7  University
2 Digit Occupational Codes
•   AGRICULTURE, FISHING AND FORESTRY
2  Forestry, logging and related service activities.
3  Agriculture, hunting and related service activities.
4  Fishing, operation of fish hacteries and fish farms.
•   MINING
5  Mining & Extraction of coal and lignite, crude petroleum and natural gas, uranium
& thorium ores, metal ores.
6  Other quarrying.
•   MANUFACTURING
7  Food products & beverages
8  Tobacco products
9  Textiles, wearing apparel, tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear.
10 Wood, (and of products of wood and cork except furniture), pulp, paper and paper
products.
11 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media.
12 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel.
13  Chemicals and chemical products.
14  Rubber and plastic products.
15  Other non-metallic mineral products.
16  Basic metals.
17  Machinery, & equipment , office machinery and computers, electrical machinery,
manufacture of medical, precision & optical instruments, watches and clocks.
18  Manufacture of fabricated metal products.
19  Manufacture of motor vechicles &  other transport equipment.
20  Other manufacturing: including manufacture of furniture, and recycling.
•   ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY
21 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply. Collection purification and
distribution of water45
•   CONSTRUCTION
22  Construction
•   WHOLESALE & RETAIL TRADE
23  Retail & wholesale trade, repair of household and personal goods.
•   HOTELS & RESTAURANTS
24  Hotels and restaurants.
•   TRANSPORT STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION
25  Land transport, water transport, air transport, cargo handling and storage, other
supporting transport activities, activities of transport agencies.
•   FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION.
26  Financial intermediation, insurance and pension funding, except compulsory
social security, activities auxiliary to financial intermediation.
27 Real estate activities, renting of machinery and equipment.
•   PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENCE
28  Public administration and defence.
•   EDUCATION
29 Education.
•   HEALTH & SOCIAL WORK
30  Health and social work.
•   OTHER SERVICES
31  Other Community, social and personal service activities Sewage & refuse
disposal, sanitation, recreational , cultural and sporting activities, other service
activities, Private households with employed persons.
32 Private Households With Employed Persons.
33 Extra-territorial organisations and bodies.THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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